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Abstract 
 
We use data on the locations of the head offices of publicly traded U.S. firms to study 
the impact of corporate headquarters on the receipts of local charitable organizations.  Cities 
like Houston, San Jose, and San Francisco gained significant numbers of corporate 
headquarters over the past two decades, while cities like Chicago and Los Angeles lost. Our 
analysis suggests that attracting or retaining the headquarters of an average firm yields 
approximately $10 million per year in contributions to local non-profits, while the headquarters of 
a larger firm (one ranked among the top 1000 in total market value) yields about $25 million per 
year.  Likewise, we find that each $1000 increase in the market value of the firms 
headquartered in a city yields 70 cents or more to local non-profits. Most of the increase in 
charitable contributions arises from an effect on the number of highly-compensated individuals 
in a city, rather than through direct donations by the corporations themselves.  
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The Geography of Giving: 
The Effect of Corporate Headquarters on Local Charities 
 
Introduction 
Much of the vital infrastructure in American cities is provided by charities.1  Colleges and 
universities, cultural institutions, and hospitals all rely on charitable donations as a major source 
of income.  These organizations in turn contribute to the “social capital” of a city, helping to 
attract new residents and in many cases defining the package of amenities that people 
associate with a city. 
In this paper we explore the effects of corporate headquarters on the level of charitable 
giving in a city.  Corporate executives are often seen as a key resource for local charities, 
serving as benefactors and fundraisers and also channeling their companies’ donations to local 
causes (Werbel and Carter, 2002).  Beginning in the 1980s, however, analysts noted a shift 
toward so-called “strategic philanthropy,” in which corporate charity is closely aligned with 
overall business objectives (see e.g., Zetlin, 1990, Saiia, Carroll and Buchholz, 2003).  In 
addition, as more U.S. companies focus internationally, ties to any one “headquarters city” may 
have weakened.  Whether these trends have lessened the impact of corporate headquarters on 
the incomes of local charities is unclear.  Indeed, despite the routine attention of the popular 
press, there is surprisingly little systematic evidence on how corporate headquarters affect local 
non-profit organizations.2  
The question of whether corporate headquarters matter to local charities has great 
practical significance. Over the past 30 years, state and local governments have assumed 
greater responsibility for economic development. They frequently offer substantial subsidies to 
                                                 
1 There is now a vast literature on the economics of charitable giving.  See Bremer (1988) and Friedman and McGarvie (2002) for 
historical overviews of American philanthropy, Himmelstein (1997) for a broad discussion of corporate giving, Andreoni (1990, 
1998), Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986), Roberts (1984) and Rose-Ackerman (1996) for theoretical analyses of individual 
incentives to give and the economic role of non-profits, and Andreoni and Payne (2003) for a recent analysis of the problem of 
“crowding out” by government funding of charitable organizations. 
2There are quite a bit of popular press on charities and corporate giving including some that focus on heaquarters moves. A recent 
example about Baltimore claims that the loss of corporate headquarters has resulted in lower donations to charities in the city (Smith 
Hopkins, 2004). 
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attract corporate headquarters to their jurisdictions (Greenstone and Moretti, 2005).  In one well-
publicized recent case, Boeing was granted $50 million (about $100,000 per job) in tax 
abatements to move its corporate headquarters to Chicago.3  Subsidies to attract headquarters 
are difficult to rationalize based solely on the jobs created.4  Supporters often point to the impact 
on local non-profits as a key justification for such packages. 
We evaluate these spillover effects using information on the locations of publicly traded 
corporations in the US from 1989 to 2002, combined with data on the contributions received by 
public charities in 147 larger cities.  During this period there was substantial turnover in 
headquarters locations, driven by the growth of new firms, mergers and acquisitions, and the 
decisions by some companies to relocate (Klier and Testa, 2002).  A newly assembled data 
base with the exact location of corporate headquarters allows us to measure the impact of 
corporate headquarters on charitable contribution flows, while controlling for observable time-
varying factors like population growth and permanent unobserved city factors.   
Our empirical analysis uses variation in both the number of headquarters in a city and 
the market capitalization of the firms headquartered there. We find that the presence of a 
corporate headquarters has a significant effect on local charities.  Our estimates suggest that an 
additional corporate headquarters is associated with about $10 million per year in additional 
public contributions to local non-profits, while the headquarters of top firms – those that are 
ranked in the top 1000 in market value at least once in the sample window – yield about $25 
million per year.  Likewise, each $1000 in combined market value for the firms headquartered in 
a city yields 70 cents or more to local non-profits.  Comparing different types of charitable 
organizations, we find that increases in the market value of locally-based firms lead to higher 
contributions for both nationally-oriented charities (such as education and research institutions) 
and those with a more local orientation (such as health care and human service providers).  
                                                 
3 The move involved around 500 top level managers but no major production facilities.  See McGuire and Garcia-Mila (2002). 
4 From a pure efficiency point of view, there are only two possible justifications for these subsidies: (1) agglomeration externalities of 
some form; and (2) donations to private charities. Hornbeck, Greenstone and Moretti (2007), Greenstone and Moretti (2005), and 
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When we investigate the dynamics of charitable giving, we find that the effects of lagged 
headquarters are larger than the effects of current counts.  This is consistent with a lag between 
the flow of charitable donations and the establishment of new headquarters (or the closing of 
old ones).  However, the same pattern does not emerge when corporate presence is measured 
by market value of the headquartered firms.  Much of the year-to-year variation in this measure 
is driven by stock market fluctuations for firms that remain headquartered in a city, rather than 
by changes in the numbers of headquarters in a city.  Thus, the data suggest a relatively direct 
connection between changes in company wealth and charitable contributions.   
The main econometric issue confronting the estimation of our models is the possibility of 
spurious correlation driven by unobserved time-varying, city-specific factors that affect 
charitable contribution rates and are correlated with headquarters or firms’ market value.  We 
suspect that these biases are more likely to affect the estimation of models based on market 
value than models based on the simple headquarters count.  But even for the headquarters 
count, it is possible that shocks to geographically concentrated industries can lead to a rise or 
fall in the number of headquarters in a particular city, and also to changes in the incomes and 
charitable contributions of workers who are affiliated with the industry but are not directly 
connected to the corporate headquarters. To at least partially address these concerns, we 
estimate models that include both current and future counts of headquarters as determinants of 
current giving and find only small and statistically insignificant effects of the future variables.   
We also present estimates of simple dynamic models that allow us to test for the endogeneity of 
corporate location choices. While far from definitive tests, these results lend some support to a 
causal interpretation of the correlation between the presence of headquarters and charitable 
donations.  
                                                                                                                                                             
Davis and Henderson (2004) discuss the possibility of agglomeration externalities for manufacturing plants. Dye, Garcia-Mila and 
McGuire (2007) discuss the potential productivity spillovers from headquarters. 
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We go on to investigate the channels through which corporate headquarters might affect 
local charities.  The presence of headquarters can raise local contributions because the 
companies themselves make donations, or because headquarters employ relatively high-
income people who make personal contributions and enhance local fundraising capacity. We 
find that most of the increase in charitable contributions arises from an effect on the number of 
highly-compensated individuals in a city, rather than through direct donations by the 
corporations.  
We conclude our empirical analysis by testing whether the gains to local charities 
associated with the presence of corporate headquarters lead to offsetting changes in local 
public expenditures.5  In particular, we focus on the impacts of additional headquarters, or 
increased market capitalization of headquartered firms, on local government spending on social 
services, schools, and hospitals.  We find imprecise negative impacts of a rise in the numbers of 
headquarters on spending on these three categories of spending.  In contrast, increases in the 
market capitalization of companies headquartered in a metropolitan area are associated with 
significant increases in local government revenues and in most categories of spending.  We 
suspect that changes in market capitalization of local firms are correlated with the strength of 
the local economy, making it difficult to disentangle a reverse crowd-out effect from the direct 
revenue effects of local demand shocks.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section I reviews the existing literature. Section II 
describes our econometric specifications. Section III describes the data, and some preliminary 
evidence. The main empirical results are in Section IV.  Section V concludes. 
                                                 
5 Most existing studies of the interaction between non-profits and the government (e.g., Roberts, 1984; Bergstrom, Blume, and 
Varian, 1986) focus on the crowding out of non-profit activity by an exogenous increase in the government supply of services.  
Becker and Lindsay (1994) present an interesting analysis of “reverse crowd-out”: the impact of private donations on government 
spending. 
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I.  Background on Corporate Giving and Local Charities 
The existing literature on corporate giving has largely focused on the question of why 
corporations donate to charity.6  The leading hypothesis is that corporate charity is an activity 
pursued by utility-maximizing managers acting as imperfect agents for shareholders (Boatsman 
and Gupta, 1996; Helland and Smith, 2006; Bartkus, Morris and Seifert, 2002; Webel and 
Carter, 2002; Trost, 2004).  The main alternative is that corporate giving is driven by profit-
maximizing concerns (Navarro, 1988; Fry, Keim, and Meiners, 1982).  Both views suggest that 
corporations will tend to focus much of their overall giving on local charities.  Under the agency 
hypothesis, CEO’s (and other top managers) presumably receive personal benefits from locally-
directed contributions, including community recognition and perquisites like access to cultural 
events.7  Under the profit maximizing hypothesis, local contributions can lead to improved 
community relations (e.g. better treatment by local regulatory agencies), and can also directly 
affect the corporation’s workforce (e.g., through improved local education or health care 
services).  For firms that sell a sizeable fraction of their production locally, contributions to local 
charities can also work as a form of advertising (as is the case with contributions to public 
television and radio, for example).8   It is estimated that there is nearly $14 billion in corporate 
charitable giving in the United States each year (Muirhead, 2006). 
There are relatively few direct studies of how firms allocate their charitable contributions. 
 Using interview data for a sample of 229 large companies in 14 cities, McElroy and Siegfried 
(1986) estimate that about 70% of corporate donations are targeted to headquarters cities.  
Since most companies have a significant share of their overall workforce in the same city as 
their headquarters, and firms also tend to contribute to charities in cities where they have plant 
                                                 
6A 1936 IRS ruling allowed corporations to receive a tax deduction for charitable donations of up to 5% of pre-tax earnings.  Until a 
1953 court ruling in New Jersey, however, the legality of corporate charity was still in dispute, with some states outlawing donations 
that did not directly benefit the company.   See Himmelstein (1997) for more detailed discussion. 
7Galaskiewicz (1997) studies donation patterns in Minneapolis-St. Paul, using data from the late 1970s and late 1980s.  He focuses 
on the membership of the CEO and board members of a company in social networks as predictors of the generosity of corporate 
giving.   
8Recent commentators have identified “strategic philanthropy” as an emerging trend in corporate giving (see e.g. Zetlin, 1990; 
Muirhead, 1999; Porter and Kramer, 2002; Saiia, Carroll and Buchholtz, 2003).  This can be interpreted as charitable giving that 
contributes to profitability. 
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facilities, this 70% estimate presumably overstates the pure headquarters share.9   
Nevertheless, a plausible range of estimates from McElroy and Siegfried (1986)’s study is that 
corporations allocate about 50-65% of their charitable contributions to headquarters cities.10  
This is similar to the 63% headquarters share estimated by Galaskiewicz (1997) for 
corporations located in Minneapolis-St. Paul.  In our analysis, due to the constraints of the data, 
we focus on coporate headquarters only. 
How big are the expected local impacts of a corporate headquarters?  Annual 
tabulations by the Conference Board for larger companies show average total charitable 
contributions on the order of $20 million dollars per year, with about one-third given as direct 
cash, and the remainder given as non-cash transfers or donations to corporate foundations.11  
Taking only the corporate direct cash donations, and assuming a 60% local share, these 
numbers suggest that a headquarters of a larger corporation could be expected to contribute 
about $4 million in cash to local charities.12  For smaller firms the averages are presumably 
smaller, though the headquarters’ share may be larger.   
In addition to the direct contributions made by the corporation, charities in a 
headquarters city may benefit from the presence of highly-compensated managers.  These 
people contribute directly to local charities, and also lend their support and expertise to local 
fund-raising efforts.   Assuming for example that the top managers in a large corporation have a 
combined income (including salary, bonuses, and incentives) of around $250 million and that 
their marginal contribution rate to non-religious charities is around 3 percent, the contributions of 
top managers would add an additional $7.5 million to the local impact of a large corporate 
headquarters.  Again, the impact of a headquarters for a smaller company is presumably 
                                                 
9Suppose that a firm allocates a fraction αH of contributions to the headquarters city, and a fraction αP to cities with plant facilities, 
and that fH of all plant facilities are in the headquarters city.  Then the overall share of contributions targeted to headquarters cities is 
αH + fH αp. 
10McElroy and Siegfried (1986) estimate that 90% of all contributions are allocated to headquarters cities or cities where the firm has 
production facilities.  Following the notation of the previous note, this implies that αH + αp = 0.9.  Assuming that fH is between 0.2 and 
0.5, the pure headquarters share (αH) is between 0.5 and 0.65. 
11See Muirhead (2002). 
12According to the Conference Board, non-cash contributions are particularly important for pharmaceutical, chemical, and computer 
and technology firms (Muirhead, 2002, page 10).  It is unclear whether non-cash contributions are allocated in the same general way 
The Geography of Giving  CAHRS WP08-08 
 
 
Cornell University 
Center for Advanced Human Resource Studies  Page 10 of 39 
smaller.  This sum will be augmented by any impact of the top managers on the efficacy of fund 
raising by local charities, or by positive “spillover” effects on other residents (or out-of-town 
contributors).  Overall, these calculations suggest that the attraction or retention of corporate 
headquarters may have a significant effect on local charities. 
II.   Methods 
To empirically evaluate the effects of corporate headquarters on local charities, we adopt 
a simple reduced form approach.  Let yct represent the public contributions received by 
charitable organizations in city c in year t.  We assume that  
(1)  yct =   αc   +   δt   +    Xctβ    +   Hctγ    +   εct , 
where αc is a city-specific fixed effect, δt  is a time effect, Xct is a set of control variables that 
reflect changes in the underlying characteristics of the city, and Hct is a measure of the 
presence of corporate headquarters in the city in year t.  We consider two types of measures of 
H.  The first is a simple count of the number of corporate headquarters, or the number of 
headquarters of large corporations.   The second is the market value of the corporations with 
headquarters in city c in year t.  These alternatives capture somewhat different dimensions of 
the “corporate presence” in a city13.  The market value measure “weighs” the headquarters of 
different firms in proportion to their relative market value.  It can also change over time even in 
the absence of any entry or exit, depending on the fortunes of local firms.  To the extent that 
corporate contributions are proportional to firm size, and larger corporations employ 
proportionally more highly paid managers at their headquarters, the market value measure may 
a relatively good indicator of the corporate presence.14  
The main econometric issue confronting the estimation of equation (1) is the possibility 
that Hct is correlated with unobserved city-specific factors that affect charitable contribution 
                                                                                                                                                             
as other contributions. It is also unclear how these are recorded by the receiving charities. 
13  There are other potential measures of H.  The number of employees in the firm is one possibility.  This is available, for example, 
in CompuStat but the variable is not audited and is known to be measured with error. 
14Note that other measures of the firm size may be preferable to market value, such as total net revenues or total number of 
employees. This may be a particular issue during our sample period because some firms with very small net revenues (or even 
negative revenues) had very high market values at the end of the 1990s. 
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rates.  For example, trends in the health of the domestic automobile industry will affect 
charitable donations in the Detroit metropolitan area not only through the direct charitable 
contributions of General Motors and Ford, and their headquarters employees, but also through 
the contributions of the many production workers who also live in the area.  We suspect that 
these biases are more likely to affect the estimation of the market value measure of H than the 
simple headquarters count.  Even in the latter case, however, shocks to geographically 
concentrated industries can lead to a rise or fall in the number of headquarters in a particular 
city, and also to changes in the incomes and charitable contributions of workers who are 
affiliated with the industry but are not directly connected to the corporate headquarters. 
It is also possible that corporations are attracted to (or emerge from) certain cities with 
particularly successful local charities.  For example, over the past decades a number of high-
tech businesses have grown up around major research universities.15  These institutions are 
also major recipients of corporate and non-corporate donations.  This “reverse causality” may 
lead to an upward bias in OLS estimates of the parameter γ in equation (1). 
To partially address these concerns, we present estimates of a simple dynamic version 
of equation (1): 
(2)   yct =   αc   +   δt   +    θc × t    +    Xctβ    +   Hctγ  +  Hct-1γLag    +  Hct+1γLead    +   εct . 
This specification adds city-specific linear trends to the basic model, as well as leads and lags 
of the headquarters measure.  The city-specific trends θc will absorb any unobserved, smoothly 
trending factors that affect charitable donations in a city and may also be correlated with H.  The 
lag term in H is included to reflect the possibility of a time lag between the arrival of new 
headquarters in a city (or the growth in the market value of firms headquartered there) and the 
flow of contributions to local charities.  Finally, the lead term in H is included to test for 
endogenous shifts in the corporate presence in a given city.  A significantly positive estimate of 
the lead coefficient (γLead), for example, can be interpreted as evidence of a “reverse causality” 
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effect from charities to headquarters, whereas an estimate close to zero is consistent with no 
such effect.  
III. Data Description 
Our empirical analysis combines two different types of data. The first is information on 
the locations of corporate headquarters by year.  We limit our attention to publicly traded firms, 
making it easy to develop estimates of the market value of the firms headquartered in a city.  
The second type of data is information on the contributions received by local charitable 
organizations.  
a.  Corporate Locations and Stock Market Valuation 
 We used the CompactDisclosure data base to retrieve the corporate addresses from the 
10-K and 10-Q filings for all active U.S. firms listed on the New York, American, and NASDAQ 
exchanges between 1989 and 2002.16  Where possible, we used the May versions of the data 
base, which typically record the 4th quarter SEC filings.  Thus, our address information generally 
pertains to the end of the calendar year.  We used a commercial zip code conversion program 
(available from zipinfo.com) supplemented with additional hand-coding to successfully map the 
5 digit zip codes for each corporate address into a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) or 
Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area (PMSA).17  For convenience, in the remainder of this paper 
we refer to these as MSA’s or simply as “cities”. 
We also retrieved for each corporation listed in the CompactDisclosure data base the 
market value of the firm (i.e. the value of all outstanding shares) as of year end, and a CUSIP 
identifier which we use to uniquely identify firms.  For each year, we ranked all active firms by 
their market value and identified the top 1000 firms in the year.  We then identified “top firms” as 
the set of 2,805 firms that were ever in the top 1000 list in any year between 1989 and 2002.  Of 
                                                                                                                                                             
15The computer-related businesses in Silicon Valley are said to have started there because of the presence of Stanford University.   
16We include firms listed on the NASDAQ over-the-counter system (the “National Market System”). The 1989 data base includes 
5642 firms (657 on the AMS, 1371 on NDQ, 2288 on NMS, and 1326 on NYS). The 2000 data base includes 6506 firms (551 on 
AMS, 897 on NDQ, 3390 on NMS, and 1668 on NYS). 
17Note that large metro areas (like New York) may consist of many PMSAs, whereas smaller areas are assigned to a single MSA.  
We adopt the convention that PMSAs in the same large area are different “cities”: thus, a corporation that moves its headquarters 
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these relatively large firms, 524 were continuously active over the entire period.18 
Table 1 presents some simple descriptive information on number, market value, and 
headquarters locations of the firms in our sample.  The first 3 columns pertain to the sample of 
“top firms” while the last 3 pertain to all firms listed on the three exchanges.  As expected, mean 
market values of the top firms are substantially larger than the corresponding values for all 
firms.  In fact, the top firms account for 85-90% of the total market value of all firms in our 
sample.   The mean and median market values of the firms in the sample rise substantially over 
time, reflecting the run-up in U.S. stock market prices in the 1990s. 
The bottom rows of Table 1 show the numbers of headquarters in selected cities in 
1989, 1995, and 2002.  These cities represent the 15 most important headquarters locations for 
the top firms in our sample as of 1989, and accounted for a steady 46% of all top firm 
headquarters over the sample period.  Their share of all headquarters was smaller (40%) but 
also quite stable.  Despite the overall stability of the group there is substantial variation between 
cities.  Los Angeles, for example, experienced a relatively large decline in the number of 
headquarters, while San Jose and San Francisco experienced relatively large gains.  Dallas and 
Houston also experienced a relatively large gain in the number of top headquarters, while New 
York and Chicago experienced relatively large losses.  Most of the other cities saw a net gain or 
loss of only 1-3 headquarters.   Some of these trends are illustrated in Figures 1a and 1b, which 
show the relative numbers of large companies headquartered in 10 cities, including two that 
were not in the top 15 in 1989 but experienced rapid growth in headquarters over the 1990s: 
Washington DC and Seattle. 
                                                                                                                                                             
from Manhattan to Newark NJ would be considered to have moved. 
18The vast majority of the remaining firms fall into three classes: those that were active in 1989 and remained continuously active 
until a “death” sometime before 2002; those that were “born” sometime after 1989 and remained continuously active until 2002; and 
those that were “born” sometime after 1989 and were continuously active until a death prior to 2002. 
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b.  Charitable Contributions 
Our data on charitable contributions are taken from information on 501(c)3 charities 
included in the annual samples of charitable organizations compiled by the Internal Revenue 
Service and released by the National Center for Charitable Statistics. Contributions to 501(c)3  
organizations are tax deductible to the contributor. The samples, known as the “Statistics of 
Table 1 
Number, Market Value, and Headquarters Locations of Publicly Traded Firms 
 
Top Firms  
(Ever in Top 1000) All Publicly Traded Firms  
1989 1995 2002 1989 1995 2002 
Number of Active Firms  1,328 1,595 1,413 5,642 6,353 5,418
Market Value of Firms: 
(millions, year end) 
Mean Value  1,805 2,906 8,257 491 864 2,419
Median Value  624 1,011 2,109 39 96 192
Location of Headquarters:  
New York  112 104 97 404 364 291
Chicago  88 94 72 210 241 187
Los Angeles  60 53 42 284 258 180
Boston  45 58 47 206 251 225
Philadelphia  44 46 43 180 170 158
Houston  35 57 48 126 197 157
Minneapolis  34 38 35 158 201 145
San Jose  34 68 89 128 194 260
Atlanta  29 30 30 97 121 125
Dallas  28 39 38 148 181 145
Stamford  25 33 17 75 71 52
Cleveland  22 28 21 70 70 53
St. Louis  22 26 19 50 67 56
San Francisco  22 34 37 71 106 125
Pittsburgh  20 23 16 49 58 51
Share of Firms in 15  
Cities (%)  47 46 46 40 40 41
Note: list of firms drawn from CompactDisclosure. Headquarters assigned to MSA based on zip code 
for corporate headquarters. Market value is in current dollars. Market values for 10% of all firms and 
1% of top firms are missing. Top firms is list of 2805 firms that were ever ranked in the top 1000 of all 
firms in a calendar year based on market capitalization in any year from 1989-2002. See text.  
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Income” sample files, include information for 11,000 to 16,000 organizations per year that filed a 
Form-990 tax return.19  Non-profit organizations classified as 501(c)3 by the IRS include most 
non-profits in education, health and human services, and the arts, as well as private grant 
making organizations, but exclude trade unions, business organizations, social and recreational 
clubs, and beneficiary societies. 
Each organization included in the sample file reports a variety of income information, 
including contributions received from the public, government grants, and other sources of 
revenue.  Organizations also report a zip code, which we convert to an MSA using the same 
procedures we followed for identifying firm headquarters.  Samples from 1990 and later include 
a sample weight variable which is meant to reflect the sampling probability for the observation.20  
Some basic information on the number of charities in the sample and their public 
contributions is provided in Table 2.  We present the actual (i.e., unweighted) numbers of 
charities and their reported public contributions in the 4 left hand columns, and the weighted 
analogues in the 4 right hand columns.  (All dollar amounts are in constant 2002 $).  Note that 
the weighted number of organizations is about 10-11 times larger than the unweighted number, 
while the weighted sum of all public contributions is only about 1.5 times larger than the 
unweighted sum.  The difference reflects the fact that small charities are sampled less 
frequently. 
The entries in the top line of the Table 2 show that the number of 501(c)3 non-profit 
organizations in U.S. metropolitan areas grew rapidly over the 1990s, as did public contributions 
to these organizations.  The next line presents similar data for a subset of 147 larger cities that 
we use in our statistical analysis.  Cities were included in this sample if they had a minimum of 9 
charities reporting from that city in each year between 1990 and 2002, and if the coefficient of 
variation of (unweighted) total annual public contributions for organizations in the city over the 
                                                 
19Sample files are also available for 501(c)3 organizations that file a short version of Form 990 (known as Form 990-EZ).  We only 
use the full Form 990 in our analyses. 
20The data contain the population of the largest nonprofits and a sample of smaller organizations that have associated sample 
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same period was less than 0.62.  Note that charities in these cities account for 85-90 percent of 
charitable organizations in all 335 MSAs, and over 90 percent of public contributions to these 
organizations.  
The lower rows of Table 2 present comparable data for the 20 cities with the highest 
levels of (unweighted) total public contributions in 1990.  Most of these cities are among the top 
15 headquarters cities shown in Table 1, although Washington DC is an interesting exception.  
Washington was not a major headquarters city in 1989 (though it gained a number of 
headquarters over the 1990s) but was the number 2 city in terms of public contributions in 1990 
and also in 2002.  Presumably this reflects the fact that many large national organizations (such 
as the Red Cross) are based in Washington.  
There is considerable variation in the city-specific trends in charitable contributions over 
our sample period.  Some of these differences are illustrated in Figures 2a and 2b, which show 
the trends in (unweighted) contributions received in 10 major cities relative to 1990.  Looking at 
Figure 2a, for example, it appears that there was much more rapid growth in contributions in 
Boston and Washington than in New York or Los Angeles.  Interestingly, the same is also true 
for the trends in the number of large companies headquartered in these towns (Figure 1a).   
We also constructed graphs similar to Figures 2a and 2b using the sample weights to 
estimate total contributions in each city.  Inspection of these graphs suggested that the 
weighted estimates are relatively noisy, reflecting the variation from year to year in the inclusion 
of mid-sized charities with relatively large sampling weights.   
 
                                                                                                                                                             
weights.  More details on the sampling scheme can be found at the National Center for Charitable Statistics web-site. 
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Table 2 
Numbers of Charitable Organizations and Public Contributions 
 
 Unweighted Weighted 
 Number 
Charities 
Public 
Contributions 
Number 
Charities 
Public 
Contributions 
 1990 2002 1990 2002 1990 2002 1990 2002 
All Cities 9,582 14,355 36,512 64,902 94,036 163,883 59,587 102,968
147 Sample Cities 8,285 12,339 34,255 59,057 79,113 136,958 54,312 91,756
New York 680 932 7,265 8,218 5,239 8,586 10,467 11,415
Washington DC 342 640 2,520 5,464 3,237 6,600 3,654 7,898
Los Angeles 362 497 2,500 3,056 4,270 5,697 3,388 4,388
Chicago 386 533 1,629 3,012 2,827 5,288 2,440 4,555
Boston 326 453 1,686 5,175 2,796 4,989 2,222 6,036
Atlanta 131 245 1,186 2,090 1,293 2,912 1,534 2,872
Seattle 97 155 258 1,212 1,376 1,564 1,445 1,850
Philadelphia 329 465 924 1,617 2,428 3,928 1,419 2,480
Dallas 110 149 802 986 1,058 1,389 1,250 1,617
San Francisco 140 247 597 1,443 1,544 3,352 919 2,169
Minneapolis 154 258 558 882 1,657 3,274 918 1,511
Providence 67 111 460 606 517 1,196 799 835
Baltimore 148 235 551 854 1,146 2,167 798 1,255
Cleveland 157 205 539 809 1,635 1,711 788 1,190
Pittsburgh 152 232 483 859 1,081 1,778 731 1,816
San Jose 55 94 442 925 604 1,234 616 1,306
Houston 98 171 439 780 1,098 2,245 588 1,313
St Louis 128 163 371 420 996 2,037 522 685
Detroit 137 178 329 577 1,206 2,326 511 1,068
Raleigh-Durham 63 105 342 1,569 526 1,031 454 1,924
Percent of All Cities Totals in:  
147 City Sample 86 86 94 91 84 84 91 89
20 Main Cities 42 42 65 62 39 39 60 57
Note: Based on 501c(3) organizations filing long forms in the IRS Statistics of Income data files. Contributions are in real 
(2002) millions of dollars. Organizations are assigned to MSA based on zip code for tax filing. See text. 
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Figure 1a 
Number of Large Corporate Headquarters in Different Cities 
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Figure 1b 
Number of Large Corporate Headquarters in Different Cities 
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Figure 2a 
Public Charitable Contributions in Different Cities 
 
The Geography of Giving  CAHRS WP08-08 
 
 
Cornell University 
Center for Advanced Human Resource Studies  Page 21 of 39 
Figure 2b 
Public Charitable Contributions in Different Cities 
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IV.   Estimation Results 
In this section we present the main empirical results of the paper. We begin in the first 
subsection presenting models that relate long-run changes in charitable giving to long run 
changes in the presence of headquarters in an area. In the second subsection, we focus on 
year-to-year variation in charitable giving and in headquarter presence. In the third subsection, 
we seek to distinguish between two possible mechanisms that may generate a link between 
charitable giving and headquarter presence in a city. Finally, in the last subsection, we ask 
whether charitable giving related to headquarters displaces public expenditures. 
a.  Models for 1990 and 2000 
Table 3 presents a series of regression models based on equation (1) in which the 
dependent variable is the weighted sum of charitable contributions to 501(c)3 organizations in 
the year 2000 for each of the 147 cities included in our estimation sample, or the change in 
contributions between 1990 and 2000.  Use of data for these two years has the advantage that 
information on the characteristics of each city can be obtained from the Decennial Censuses.  
The different models use different measures of corporate headquarters: the number of top firms 
headquartered in the city (columns 1 and 6); the number of all firms headquartered in the city 
(columns 2 and 7); the market value of top firms in the city (columns 3 and 8); and the market 
value of all firms headquartered in the city (columns 4 and 9).  We also present one 
specification with three of these four measures (columns 5 and 10).  All the models include 3 
key control variables: the adult population of the city; the employment-population rate (for 16-59 
year olds) in the city; and the fraction of adults with a college degree or higher.  
The estimates point to a number of interesting conclusions.  First, the estimated 
headquarters effects are positive and highly statistically significant in all of the models that 
include only a single headquarters measure.  Second, as might be expected if there are 
unobserved differences that affect both charitable contributions and the probability of being a 
headquarters city, the estimated headquarters effects tend to be larger in the cross-sectional 
The Geography of Giving  CAHRS WP08-08 
 
 
Cornell University 
Center for Advanced Human Resource Studies  Page 23 of 39 
models than in the first-differenced models.  Third, the impact of an additional headquarters for 
a top firm – $25 million in the first-differenced model in column 6 -- is about 2.5 times larger than 
the impact of an additional headquarters for any firm– $10 million in the first-differenced model 
in column 7.  Interestingly, the $25 million impact is much larger than our rough calculation of 
the likely size of direct corporate donations by a large firm headquartered in a city ($4 million), 
and suggests an important effect from the employees of the company.  Fourth, the impacts of 
the market value of top firms and all firms headquartered in a city are very similar.  This 
comparison suggests that the local contributions arising from the presence of a corporate 
headquarters are roughly proportional to the market value of the company.21  Finally, the 
specification in column 10 suggests that our sample lacks the power to separately identify the 
effects of the number of headquarters and the market value of firms headquartered in a city. 
Given the apparent noisiness of the weighted contribution totals for different cities, we 
re-estimated the first differenced models using unweighted contribution totals. The results are 
reported in the first four columns of Table 4.  As would be expected, the coefficient estimates 
obtained using the unweighted contributions are smaller, but their general patterns are very 
similar to those obtained from the weighted data.22 
The relationship between the change in the number of large corporations headquartered 
in a city and the change in public contributions received by the charities in those cities is 
illustrated in Figure 3.  Each of the 147 cities in our estimation sample is shown by an open 
square.  For reference, we have labeled some of the most interesting cities.  Consistent with the 
regression results in Tables 3 and 4, the graph suggests a relatively strong positive relationship 
between changes in the number of headquarters and growth in charitable contributions.  The 
city of San Jose is an interesting “outlier”.  This city experienced a very rapid growth in the 
concentration of large headquarters, but not particularly strong growth in charitable 
                                                 
21 This finding also reflects the fact that top firms account for 85-90% of the value of all firms. 
22 If the unweighted contributions represent about 65 percent of the total contributions, then one would expect the coefficients from 
the models fit to the unweighted data to be about 65 percent as large as the coefficients for the models fit to the weighted data.  The 
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contributions.  One possibility is that the count of top headquarters in San Jose is inflated by the 
“tech bubble” that created large market values for many Silicon Valley firms with small (or even 
negative) operating profits.  Arguably, these firms (and their employees) would not be expected 
to contribute to charities at the same rate as more traditional firms with similar market values. 
When we re-estimate the models in columns 6 to 9 of Table 3 excluding San Jose, our 
estimates increase substantially.  In fact all coefficient estimates are on the order of 1.5 to 2 
times higher compared to the ones shown in Table 3. For example, the coefficients (and 
standard errors) for the specifications in columns 6, 7, 8 and 9 are 53.95 (10.19), 15.24 (2.60), 
1.40 (0.30), and 1.48 (0.29) respectively.  
Table 3 
Cross-Sectional and First-Differenced Models of 
 the Effect of Corporate Headquarters on Charitable Contributions in a City 
 
 Cross-Sectional Models: Data for 2000 
First-Difference: 
Change from 1990 to 2000 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Number of Top Firms in City  
(coefficient in millions of $)  
36.59 
(6.63) 
   7.17 
(18.96)
24.20 
(6.79)
   -16.08 
(13.65)      
Number of Traded Firms in City  
(coefficient in millions of $)  
 10.72 
(2.37)
  0.43 
(4.82) 
 10.09 
(2.12) 
  11.43 
(3.55)       
Market Value of Top Firms in City  
(coefficient in $ per $1000 of 
value)  
  1.77 
(0.29)
    0.65 
(0.20)
  
        
Market Value of All Firms in City  
(coefficient in $ per $1000 of 
value)  
   1.74 
(0.28) 
1.43 
(0.56) 
   0.67 
(0.19)
0.47 
(0.28)       
R-squared  0.70 0.68 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.38 0.42 0.37 0.37 0.42 
Controls for population, 
employment-population, and 
fraction of adults with college 
education 
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Note: Sample includes 146 cities. Dependent variable in columns 1-5 is the total public contributions received by charitable organizations 
in the city in 2000. Dependent variable in columns 6-10 is the change in total public contributions from 1990 to 2000. All models include 
controls for adult population, employment-population rate, and fraction of adults with a college degree (estimated from the 1990 and 2000 
Censuses). Standard errors are in parentheses.  
                                                                                                                                                             
coefficients in columns 1-4 of Table 4 are about 80% as large as the ones in columns 6-9 of Table 3. 
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Table 4 
Effect of Corporate Headquarters on Contributions to  
Two Classes of Charitable Organizations  
(Unweighted Estimates of Contributions) 
 
 Contributions to All Charitable Organizations 
Contributions to Nationally- 
Oriented Organizations 
Contributions to Locally- 
Oriented Organizations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Number of Top Firms in City 
(coefficient in millions of $) 20.30 (5.37) 
   14.82 
(3.88) 
   5.48 
(2.48) 
   
          
Number of Traded Firms in City 
(coefficient in millions of $)  8.13 (1.69)  
7.31 
(1.17) 
   0.82 
(0.81) 
  
      
Market Value of Top Firms in City 
(coefficient in $ per $1000 of value)   0.61 (0.16) 
   0.25 
(0.12) 
   0.35 
(0.07) 
 
          
Market Value of All Firms in City 
(coefficient in $ per $1000 of value)    0.61 (0.16) 
   0.27 
(0.11) 
   0.35 
(0.07)           
R-squared 0.36 0.40 0.37 0.37 0.25 0.35 0.20 0.20 0.37 0.35 0.46 0.46 
Controls for population, 
employment-population, and 
fraction of adults with college 
education 
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Note: Sample includes 146 cities. All models are in first differences, using data for 1990 and 2000. Dependent variable in columns 1-4 is change in total 
contributions for all organizations. Dependent variable in columns 5-8 is change in contributions for 'nationally oriented' organizations. Dependent variable 
in columns 9-12 is change in contributions for 'locally oriented' organizations. See text for classification. See notes to Table 3. In this table, contributions 
of sampled charities are not inflated by sampling weights. Standard errors are in parentheses.  
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Figure 3 
Decadal Changes in Top Headquarters and Public Contributions 
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An interesting question is whether all types of charities benefit equally from the presence 
of corporate headquarters in a city.  To provide some initial indication, we divided charities into 
two groups, based on an rough distinction between organizations with a national orientation 
(including education, medical and science research, and grant making organizations) and those 
with a local orientation (including health and human service providers, and cultural 
organizations).  We then re-estimated the first differenced models using as alternative 
dependent variables total contributions to each of these two types of charities.   The results, 
shown in columns 5-12 of Table 4, suggest that when corporate presence is measured by the 
market value measures, the two types of charities both benefit.   On the other hand, when 
corporate presence is measured by the number of headquarters in a city, more of the benefit 
seems to flow to nationally oriented organizations. 
b.  Dynamic Models Using Annual Data 
Following the discussion in section III, we now present estimates of the simple dynamic 
model outlined in equation (2). To do so, we fit a series of models using annual (as opposed to 
decennial) data on charitable contributions and headquarters in each city.  The results are 
presented in Table 5.  For simplicity, we only show results for two measures of corporate 
presence: the number of firms headquartered in a city (columns 1-3); and the market value of all 
firms headquartered in a city (columns 4-6).  The models in the upper panel of the table exclude 
city-specific trends, while these are included in the models in bottom panel.  The dependent 
variable for all models is the unweighted sum of public contributions to all charities in a city and 
given year.23 
Consider first the models in the upper panel of Table 5 that include only the current 
value of the headquarters measure.  The specification in column 1 yields a coefficient of 9.51, 
which should be compared to the estimate of 8.13 in column 2 of Table 4.  When we use the 
                                                 
23 Because the dynamic models include city-specific trends, here we do not control for population, employment-population and 
fraction of college graduates as we did in the previous Tables. Adding these additional controls has no impact on the estimates 
reported in Table 5. 
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count of firms with headquarters in a city as a measure of corporate presence, there is not much 
difference between the long-differences specification and the annual model.   By comparison, 
when we use the market value of firms headquartered in a city as a measure of presence, the 
annual specification leads to a larger estimated impact. (Compare the 1.59 coefficient estimate 
in column 4 of Table 5 to the 0.61 estimate in column 4 of Table 4).   
Table 5 
Effect of Corporate Headquarters on  
Charitable Contributions in a City 
 
 Headquarters Measure = 
Number of Traded Firms 
(coefficient in millions of $) 
Headquarters Measure = 
Market Value of All Firms 
(coefficient in $ per $1000 
of value) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
A. Models with City and Year 
Fixed Effects 
      
Year t 9.51 (0.43) 
2.74 
(0.82) 
1.15 
(1.16) 
1.59 
(0.06) 
1.25 
(0.20) 
1.31 
(0.26) 
Year t-1  7.83 (0.81) 
8.10 
(0.82) 
 0.54 
(0.29) 
0.51 
(0.30)   
Year t+1   1.61 (0.84) 
  -0.03 
(0.10)     
R-squared 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 
B. Models with City and Year 
Fixed Effects, and City-
Specific Trends 
      
Year t 2.67 (0.64) 
-1.02 
(0.63) 
-0.92 
(0.74) 
1.57 
(0.07) 
1.68 
(0.14) 
1.49 
(0.16) 
Year t-1  9.33 (0.59) 
9.27 
(0.64) 
 -0.18 
(0.18) 
-0.08 
(0.18)   
Year t+1   -0.16 (0.64) 
  0.13 
(0.07)     
R-squared 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
Note: Sample includes 1470 observations on 147 cities in each year from 1990 to 1999. Dependent 
variable is the sum of all public contributions reported by charities in each city/year, not inflated by 
sampling weights. Models in upper panel include fixed effects for city and year. Models in lower panel 
include fixed effects for city and year, and city-specific linear trends. Headquarters measure used in 
models in columns 1-3 is the number of publicly traded firms located in the city. Headquarters measure 
used in models in columns 4-6 is the market value of all publicly traded firms located in the city. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. 
 
Comparisons of the other specifications in Table 5 to these benchmarks suggest several 
conclusions.  First, adding city-specific linear trends does not have much effect on any of the 
models except the model with only a current value of the number of headquarters in the city.  
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Second, when a lagged value of the number of headquarters is included, the lagged value is 
large and positive whereas the current value is smaller.  This is consistent with some time lag 
between the flow of charitable donations and the establishment of new headquarters (or the 
closing of old ones).  Interestingly, however, the same pattern does not emerge when corporate 
presence is measured by market value of the headquartered firms.  Much of the year-to-year 
variation in this measure is driven by stock market fluctuations for firms that remain 
headquartered in a city, rather than by changes in the numbers of headquarters in a city.  Thus, 
the data suggest a relatively direct connection between changes in company wealth and 
charitable contributions.   
Finally, the lead values of the headquarters measures in the models in columns 3 and 6 
are all relatively small and statistically insignificant.  While this is far from a definitive test, it does 
provide some evidence that the relationship between corporate presence and charitable 
contributions is not driven by serious reverse causality. 
c.     Mechanisms 
We have shown that the presence and market value of corporate headquarters are 
associated with a significant increase in donations to local charities. In theory, corporate 
headquarters could benefit local charities through two distinct channels (see Section I). First, 
there are the direct contributions made by the corporation itself.  Second, the presence of 
corporate headquarters increases the number of highly compensated individuals in a city. 
These people are likely to contribute directly to local charities, and to lend their support to local 
fund-raising efforts, leading to an increase in local charitable giving.  
In this sub-section, we seek to shed some light on the relative importance of these two 
channels. We begin by quantifying the effect of headquarters on the share of high-income 
individuals (personal income above $100,000) in a city. To justify subsidies, municipalities often 
argue that by bringing managerial jobs to a city, corporate headquarters lead to an increase in 
the number of highly paid individuals.  To the best of our knowledge, however, there is no 
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systematic evidence on the importance of this effect.   We then re-estimate the relationship 
between headquarters and charitable contributions controlling for the number of high-income 
individuals.  To the extent that this addition leads to a reduction in the coefficient on the 
corporate presence variable, we infer that a fraction of the measured presence effect in Tables 
3-5 works through an effect on the number of high-income people in the city.  
Table 6 presents models similar to the specifications in Table 3 but taking as the 
dependent variable the number of people in the city with income larger than $100,000 per 
year.24  The entry for the first-differenced model in column 6 suggests that the addition of a new 
top headquarters in a city is associated with a roughly 800 person increase in the number of 
individuals with income over $100,000 per year. The corresponding figure for the average 
publicly traded firm in column 7 is 275. Both coefficients are precisely estimated.  
The other specifications in Table 6 show that the number of high-income people in a city 
is also related to the total market capitalization of firms headquartered in the city.  The models in 
columns 8 and 9 suggest that this effect is economically large and statistically significant.  
Moreover, the comparison of columns 8 and 9 indicates that a one dollar increase in market 
capitalization has roughly the same effect on the number of rich individuals, irrespective of the 
size of the firm.  
 Having found that the presence of a corporate headquarters significantly affects the 
number of high-income people in a city, we now turn to the question of how much of the impact 
of corporate headquarters on charitable giving can be attributed to this channel, versus a 
“direct” effect of corporate presence holding constant the number of high income people in the 
city.  The models in Table 7 expand on the specifications in Table 3 by including the number of 
people earning more than $100,000 per year as an added control. The contrast between the 
first differenced models in Table 3 and Table 7 is striking. The addition of just one variable 
                                                 
24 This variable was calculated from the 1990 and 2000 Census of Population. It refers to individuals 16 or older. The metropolitan 
areas with the largest number of individuals with personal income over $100,000 are Los Angeles and New York (about 280,000 in 
2000, and 230,000 in 1990), followed by Chicago (260,000 in 2000 and 170,000 in 1990). 
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results in a marked increase in the R-squared of the first differenced models, and a dramatic fall 
in the estimated effect of corporate presence.   In particular, the models in columns 6 to 9 in 
Table 7 indicate that after controlling for the share of workers who earn more than $100,000, 
increases in the number of headquarters or increases in their market value have virtually no 
effect on charitable contributions in a city. For example, the coefficient on the number of top 
headquarters drops from 24.20 in Table 3 to 0.48 in Table 7. Similarly, the coefficient on the 
market value of top firms drops from a statistically significant 0.65 to a statistically insignificant -
0.21. 
By contrast, the coefficient on the number of individuals with income larger than 
$100,000 is sizable and statistically significant. In the first differenced models, it is around 30, 
indicating that the presence of one additional person who earns over $100,000 per year is 
associated with a extra $30,000 in charitable contributions. According to IRS reports, in year 
2000 the average charitable contribution for individuals with income above $100,000 was 
$8700, or about 30% of the estimated impact of the presence of an additional person earning 
$100,000 or more on local giving.25    It is important to realize, however, that our estimates are 
not directly comparable with the IRS statistics. On one hand, the IRS figure includes deductions 
for both local and national charities, while our estimates only reflect contributions to local 
charities. On the other hand, the IRS figure only includes personal contributions, while our 
estimates will incorporate the donations from other people in the city or from outside the city 
attributable to the fund-raising efforts of high-income people. 
In sum, the comparison of Table 3 and Table 7 suggests that the main channel through 
which corporate headquarters benefit local charities is by raising the number of high-income 
people in a city, rather than by increasing the amount of direct corporate contributions that are 
channeled to local charities 
                                                 
25 This number was obtained by summing entries for incomes above $100,000 in column 79 and dividing the sum by the sum of 
entries in column 78 in Table 2.1 of IRS Publication 1304. 
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Table 6 
Cross-Sectional and First-Differenced Models of  
the Effect of Headquarters on the Number of High-Income People in a City 
 
 Dependent Variable = number of people earning > $100,000 per year 
 Cross-Sectional Models: Data for 2000 First-Difference: Change from 1990 to 2000 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Number of Top Firms in City 501.11(96.92)    
-316.98 
(268.12) 
800.50 
(141.31)    
-426.71 
(269.24)
Number of Traded Firms in City  214.47(31.92   
0.28 
(0.07)  
275.15
(44.89)   
231.88 
(70.03) 
Market Value of Top Firms in City   18.50 (4.41)     
27.20 
(3.94)   
Market Value of All Firms in City    18.50 (4.31) 
5.57 
(7.85)    
27.50 
(3.82)
25.50 
(5.45) 
R-squared 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.69 0.70 0.72 0.72 0.74 
Controls for population, 
employment-population, and 
fraction of adults with college 
education 
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Note: Sample includes 146 cities. All models include controls for adult population, employment-population rate, and fraction of adults with a college degree 
(estimated from the 1990 and 2000 Censuses). Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 7 
Cross-Sectional and First-Differenced Models of the Effect of Corporate Headquarters 
on Charitable Contributions in a City  
(controlling for income) 
 
 
Cross-Sectional Models: Data for 2000 First-Difference: Change from 1990 to 2000 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Number of Top Firms in City  
(coefficient in millions of $)  
30.15 
(7.13) 
   11.62 
(18.74) 
0.48 
(5.94) 
   -3.28 
(11.15)
      
Number of Traded Firms in City  
(coefficient in millions of $)  
 7.85 
(2.69) 
  -3.50 
(5.02) 
2.42 
(1.94) 
   4.48 
(2.98)       
Market Value of Top Firms in City  
(coefficient in $ per $1000 of value) 
  1.53 
(0.30) 
    -0.21 
(0.18) 
  
        
Market Value of All Firms in City  
(coefficient in $ per $1000 of value) 
   1.50 
(0.29) 
1.35 
(0.55) 
   -0.20 
(0.18) 
-0.30 
(0.24)       
Population with > 100k in income  12.67 (5.68) 
13.39 
(6.17) 
13.08 
(5.39) 
12.90 
(5.40) 
14.06 
(5.90) 
29.64 
(3.19)  
27.9 
# (3.23) 
31.68 
(3.32) 
31.73 
(3.35) 
29.99 
(3.48) 
R-squared  0.71 0.69 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.61  0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 
Controls for population, 
employment-population, and 
fraction of adults with college 
education 
yes yes yes yes yes yes  yes yes yes yes 
Note: Sample includes 146 cities. Models and sample are similar to the one in Table 3, but we now control for the fraction of the population  
with income above $100,000. Dependent variable in columns 1-5 is the total public contributions received by charitable organizations in the city in 2000. 
Dependent variable in columns 6-10 is the change in total public contributions from 1990 to 2000. All models include controls for adult population, 
employment-population rate, and fraction of adults with a college degree (estimated from the 1990 and 2000 Censuses). Standard errors are in 
parentheses.  
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d.  Public Expenditures 
In light of the impact of corporate headquarters on local charities, an interesting question 
is what happens to local public spending on social services, schools, and hospitals.  As noted in 
Becker and Lindsay (1994), it is possible that an increase in local charitable contributions leads 
to “reverse crowd out” – a reduction in local government spending. The magnitude of this effect 
has important theoretical and policy implications for the overall impact of charitable 
organizations. 
Consider the following simplified model of local government spending (G) on a particular 
public service (e.g., welfare): 
(2) G  =  F( Y, X)   −  λ P  , 
where Y is total community income, X is a set of preference shifters, P is the dollar value of the 
service supplied by local non-profits, and λ is a “reverse crowd-out” parameter (with 0≤ λ≤1).  
The income of local non-profits is increased by the presence of corporate headquarters in a 
metropolitan area, suggesting that P will increase when there are more corporations (or 
corporations with larger market capitalization) in the area.  If this was the only effect, it would be 
possible to estimate λ by instrumental variables, using local corporate headquarters as 
instruments for P.  Changes in the number or market value of corporations in an area may also 
affect community income, however, invalidating the IV procedure.  In light of this, we follow a 
simple reduced form approach and relate changes in the number or market value of local 
corporations to changes in local government spending, focusing in particular on education, 
health, and welfare – three areas where there is substantial overlap between the public and 
non-profit sectors.  A reduced form analysis yields estimates of the combined derivative    
(3) ∂F/∂Y × ∂Y/∂Corp   −  λ ∂P/∂Corp 
where ∂Y/∂Corp represents the effect of the measure of corporate presence on local income, 
and ∂P/∂Corp represents the effect of corporate presence on service provision by local 
nonprofits. 
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Table 8 present first-differenced models similar to those in Table 3, where the dependent 
variable is total public spending, or spending on a specific category of services, and the key 
independent variable is a measure of local corporate presence.  Data on public expenditures 
are from the Annual Survey of Governments and the Censuses of Governments, aggregated 
across all local government entities to the level of the metropolitan area.  For example, the 
dependent variable in column 1 is the 1990-2000 change in total expenditures of all local 
governments that belong to the relevant metropolitan area.26 The dependent variables in 
columns 2 are the changes in public expenditures for elementary and secondary schooling, 
health, police, and welfare, respectively. Column 6 shows estimates for total public revenues.  In 
the bottom row, we report the 2000 level of the relevant dependent variable. Each entry in the 
Table is from a separate regression.  
The estimates in Table 8 point to different conclusions about the effects of the number of 
headquarters in a metropolitan area and the market value of the firms headquartered there. The 
coefficients in rows 1 and 2, associated with the numbers of headquarters in an area, are all 
negative but relatively imprecisely estimated.  As a point of comparison, note that our estimates 
in Table 3 suggest that the headquarters of a top firm leads to an increase in charitable 
donations of about 25 million, while the headquarters of any firm leads to an increase about 
one-half as large.  The estimated impact of an additional top headquarters on combined local 
government spending on schooling, health, and welfare is -7.6 million, while the impact of 
additional headquarters for any firm is -4.5 million.  Thus, the estimated effects of the number of 
headquarters are consistent with a value of λ = −⅓, assuming that changes in the numbers of 
headquarters have no effect on local income.  However, the estimates are imprecise, and we 
cannot rule out a net effect of zero (or even of a modest positive value) from an increase in the 
number of corporations headquartered in a city. 
                                                 
26 We combine data from the Annual Surveys of Government (ASG, available for the larger government entities in most larger cities) 
with data from the Censuses of Government (available every 5 years for all government entities).  In cases where a certain entity 
only reports in the Census, we use linear interpolation to infer values for the inter-censal years.  We then aggregate the interpolated 
Census data and the ASG data across all entities in each MSA/PMSA, using 2000 MSA definitions. 
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In contrast the entries in rows 3 and 4 are positive and statistically significant. These 
estimates indicate that increases in the stock market value of companies headquartered in a 
city are associated with significant increases in the revenues of local governments, and in most 
categories of spending.   Recall from Table 3 that each $1000 in additional market capitalization 
of firms headquartered in a city is associated with about 70 cents in increased charitable 
contributions.  The gain in total revenues of local governments is about $4.80 (column 6) – 7 
times larger than the effect on local charities, and indicative of a powerful link between the stock 
market value of local firms and the strength of the local economy that obviates any reverse 
crowd out effect.   Interestingly, about 30% of the increased revenues associated with greater 
market capitalization of local firms are spent on education, health, and welfare.  
Table 8 
First-Differenced Models of the Effect of Corporate Headquarters on Public Expenditures 
 
Change from 1990 to 2000 in Local Government Spending/Revenues:  
 Total Expenditures  Schooling Health Police Welfare 
Total  
Revenues
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
Measure of Headquarters:        
Number of Top Firms in City  
(coefficient in millions of $)  
-19.98  
(31.90)  
-4.17  
(9.53)  
-1.84  
(1.68)  
-2.00  
(1.94)  
-1.62  
(2.99)  
-30.05  
(36.57)  
Number of Traded Firms in City  
(coefficient in millions of $)  
-10.74  
(10.39)  
-0.3  
(0.31)  
-0.61  
(0.54)  
-1.27  
(0.62)  
-2.95  
(0.94)  
-18.67  
(11.86)  
Market Value of Top Firms in City  
(coefficient in $ per $1000 of value)  
4.28  
(0.85)  
1.08  
(0.26)  
0.09  
(0.05)  
0.24  
(0.05)  
0.35  
(0.08)  
4.86  
(0.96)  
Market Value of All Firms in City  
(coefficient in $ per $1000 of value)  
4.22  
(0.83)  
1.00  
(0.25)  
0.12  
(0.05)  
0.23  
(0.05)  
0.34  
(0.08)  
4.71  
(0.96)  
Mean of Dep. Var. in Levels in 2000  
(in millions of $)  4954  1681  124  252  228  5087  
Controls for population, 
employment-population, and 
fraction of adults with college 
education 
yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Note: Sample includes 143 MSA/PMSA's. Each entry is from a separate regression.  
Dependent variable is the change in the relevant expenditure or revenue amount for all local government entities  
in the MSA/PMSA (using 2000 MSA definitions). Data represent combination of information from Annual  
Survey of Governments and interpolated data from Censuses of Government -- see text.  
All models include controls for adult population, employment-population rate, and fraction of adults with a college  
degree, estimated from the 1990 and 2000 Censuses. Standard errors in parentheses.  
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V.  Conclusions 
The past twenty years have been characterized by marked differences in the ability of 
different cities to attract and retain corporate headquarters. Cities like Houston, San Jose, and 
San Francisco have gained a significant numbers of corporate headquarters, while cities like 
New York, Chicago and Los Angeles have lost. Local leaders and politicians work hard to 
attract and retain corporate headquarters in their communities, often providing tax incentives to 
sweeten the deal. These incentives are sometimes justified by the claim that locally-headed 
corporations are a significant source of money and fund-raising talent for local non-profits. 
These claims are difficult to verify, since the existing empirical evidence is limited.  
In this paper we seek to empirically assess the influence of corporate headquarters in a 
city on non-profit organizations there. Our analysis suggests that attracting or retaining the 
headquarters of an average firm yields approximately $10 million per year in public contributions 
to local non-profits, while the headquarters of a larger firm yields about $25 million per year.   
Changes in the market capitalization of firms headquartered in a city are also important 
determinants of charitable donations. We find that each 1000 dollar increase in the market value 
of the firms headquartered in a city yields 70 cents or more to local non-profits.  
Most of these increases in charitable contributions seem to be due to the fact that the 
presence of corporate headquarters raises the number of rich individuals in an area. The 
addition of a new headquarters in a city is associated with an increase in the number of 
individuals with income larger than $100,000 equal to 275. By contrast, we find limited support 
for the notion that the presence of corporate headquarters benefits charities directly, through 
corporate donations. Given that the vast majority of firms in our sample produce nationally 
traded goods, this finding may be not too surprising. Profit maximizing firms with customers all 
over the country should have limited incentives to contribute only to local charities. 
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